

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT**

ENDC/PV.206
11 August 1964
ENGLISH

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND SIXTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 11 August 1964, at 10.30 a.m.

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Chairman:

Mr. C. LUKANOV

(Bulgaria)

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PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A. CORREA do LAGO
Mr. E. HOSANNAH

Bulgaria:

Mr. C. LUKANOV
Mr. G. GHELEV
Mr. G. YANKOV
Mr. I. BOEV

Burma:

U SAIN BWA
U HTOON SHEIN

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS
Mr. J.F.M. BELL
Mr. R.M. TAIT
Mr. P.D. LEE

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. M. KLUSAK
Mr. V. VAJNAR
Mr. A. MIKULIN

Ethiopia:

Lij Mikael IMRU
Ato S. TEFERRA

India:

Mr. R.K. NEHRU
Mr. K.P. LUKOSE
Mr. K. NARENDRANATH

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. R. GUIDOTTI
Mr. S. AVETTA
Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. A. GOMEZ ROBLEDO
Mr. M. TELLO
Mr. J. MERCADO

Nigeria:

Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. LOBODYCZ
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI
Mr. H. SOKALSKI
Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI

Romania:

Mr. V. DUMITRESCU
Mr. E. GLASER
Mr. I. IACOB
Mr. V. CONSTANTINESCU

Sweden:

Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD
Mr. U. ERICSSON
Mr. B. VEGESACK

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN
Mr. L.I. MENDELYEVICH
Mr. S.A. BOGOMOLOV
Mr. I.M. PALENYKH

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN
Mr. A. OSMAN
Mr. M. KASSEM
Mr. A.A. SALAM

United Kingdom:

Mr. J.G. TAHOURDIN
Mr. A.J. WILLIAMS
Mr. J.M. EDES

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United States of America:

Mr. C.H. TIMBERLAKE

Mr. S. de PALMA

Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Bulgaria) (translation from Russian): I declare open the 206th meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Before turning to the questions on the agenda for our meeting today, I should like to remind all delegations that the Head of State, Chairman of the Council of State of the People's Republic of Poland, Aleksander Zawadzki, died in Warsaw on 7 August. I think that I shall be interpreting the general wish of all the delegations if we express on behalf of the Committee to the delegation of the People's Republic of Poland our heartfelt condolences on that occasion.

Our co-Chairmen have asked to speak in that respect. I call upon Mr. Tsarapkin.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I would suggest that we begin by observing one minute of silence.

The CHAIRMAN (Bulgaria) (translation from Russian): If there are no objections, it is proposed that we observe one minute of silence in tribute to the memory of Mr. Zawadzki.

The representatives stood in silence for one minute.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): The Soviet delegation expresses to the delegation of the People's Republic of Poland its profound condolence on the great loss suffered by the Polish people and Government in the death of an outstanding statesman and political leader of the People's Republic of Poland, the Chairman of the Council of State, Chairman of the National Unity Front, member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party, Comrade Aleksander Zawadzki.

In the Soviet Union Comrade Zawadzki was well known as an outstanding fighter for the liberation of Poland from Hitlerite occupation, as one of the organizers of the Polish Army during the Second World War, and as one of the builders of the new socialist Poland. Comrade Zawadzki also made a great contribution to the strengthening of peace and friendship among the peoples, and to the development of peaceful relations with all countries of the world. The Soviet people will cherish the memory of Comrade Aleksander Zawadzki, an outstanding statesman of socialist Poland.

Mr. TIMBERLAKE (United States of America): I should like to associate my delegation and myself with you, Mr. Chairman, and with Mr. Tsarapkin in conveying the condolences of the United States delegation to Mr. Lobodycz and our other colleagues of the Polish delegation on the death last week of Aleksander Zawadzki, the Chairman of the Polish Council of State.

Mr. LOBODYCZ (Poland): I wish to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and the co-Chairmen for being kind enough to express condolences on the untimely death of Aleksander Zawadzki, the Chairman of the Council of State of the Polish People's Republic. His death is a painful loss to my country -- and to the entire Polish people. The ardent fight for progress and social justice, the glorious struggle against the Nazi invader, work for the benefit of the Polish people in the most responsible posts since the very day of Poland's liberation from the barbarous Nazi rule, long-time chairmanship of the Council of State -- that was in short the path of his life. He was also for many years Chairman of the National Unity Front, an organization which combines the efforts of the entire Polish nation aimed at the consolidation of peace and the transformation of Poland into an industrialized country with an economic potential capable of serving the needs of the Polish people and of international economic co-operation.

Aleksander Zawadzki, social leader, soldier and politician, showed how to fight for the peace and security of his own country and for peace and security in general. He contributed greatly to the strengthening of Poland's fraternal friendship with other socialist countries and to the development of friendly relations with countries of the entire world based on the principle of peaceful coexistence. He was a relentless advocate of the great objective which is also the primary goal of our Conference -- general and complete disarmament. Aleksander Zawadzki always enjoyed the highest respect and the sincere affection of the Polish nation, which today is plunged into mourning by his passing.

Once again I thank the members of the Committee for their expressions of sympathy.

The CHAIRMAN (Bulgaria) (translation from Russian): I assume that the Committee can now pass on to the agenda of today's meeting.

I should like to speak as representative of the Bulgarian People's Republic. But first of all, permit me on behalf of the Government of Bulgaria and its delegation to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to express once again to the delegation of the People's Republic of Poland our fraternal condolences on the loss of such an outstanding statesman of Poland as was Aleksander Zawadzki. All the Bulgarian people knew Zawadzki as a fighter for the liberties of the people, a great democrat, a great advocate of friendship and peace among the peoples. That is how he will be remembered for generations.

During the past few weeks we have been informed several times of the lack of progress in the discussions between the co-Chairmen on the question of the terms of reference of a working group that could deal with the task of working out the practical details of the problem of eliminating nuclear weapon delivery vehicles on the basis of a mutually-acceptable agreement of principle. This situation alone shows how premature would be the establishment of such a working group, and at the same time how pointless and even harmful it might prove for our future discussions, if at the outset the Committee were unable to determine clearly and unambiguously the main direction of the activities of the working group.

The discussions on this question which took place at the 198th, 200th, 202nd and 204th meetings of the Committee showed even more clearly that it is essential to arrive at a uniform approach and to continue our efforts to find a really agreed basis of principle if we truly desire that the working group should not function in vain. Obviously this point of view is shared by the majority of the delegations, as can be seen quite clearly from the efforts of the delegations of the non-aligned States represented in the Committee. As we understand it, these efforts have been aimed at finding a basis for the activities of the working group which, being acceptable to all the parties concerned, would at the same time create the most favourable conditions for really fruitful activities in the working group. On the other hand, there is a desire to find such a basis for the activities of the working group as would preclude the possibility of a mere repetition of the discussions which have taken place in our Committee on the problem of eliminating nuclear weapon delivery vehicles -- in other words a desire to avoid another deadlock and further waste of time.

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We consider that the efforts of the delegations of the non-aligned countries in this field bear witness to their constant and sincere desire to achieve rapid and substantial progress in our negotiations. At the same time, however, these efforts point to the need to deepen our discussion on the problem of eliminating nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. Consequently the Committee must continue its discussion of this issue. Any decision to pass on to some other item of the agreed procedure (ENDC/52) would at present be premature and, apart from everything else, would mean that we do not sufficiently value the aforementioned efforts of the non-aligned States.

During the discussions at our recent meetings the Western delegations have made many efforts to justify their interpretation of the reasons which have so far prevented agreement on the terms of reference of the working group.

First of all we are struck by the particular care of the Western delegations not so much to find ways of overcoming the divergencies as to relieve themselves of the responsibility and shift it on to those who are quite obviously not responsible: namely, the delegations of the socialist countries. Such a position can hardly be called constructive. Furthermore, with the same aim in view, the Western delegations at the most recent meetings of the Committee have reached varying and contradictory conclusions. While the representatives of Canada and Italy (ENDC/PV.202, pp.21, 23 et seq.) have shown excessive pessimism and recommended that for the time being we should abandon the search for a mutually-acceptable basis for the terms of reference of the working group, the representatives of the United States of America and the United Kingdom have adopted another approach and have tried to put before us a very simplified method by which the differences could be eliminated.

In this respect the argumentation of the representative of the United States is very characteristic. In Mr. Timberlake's opinion "we are engaged in two parallel discussions" -- on procedure and substance --, and in his opinion "the question of setting up a working group ... is procedural" (ENDC/PV.200, p.15). If we were to follow right through the logic of this "separation" of the discussion into "procedure" and "substance", as is done by the United States delegation in this case, we should arrive at the absurd conclusion that not only the problem of eliminating nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, but all the basic problems of general

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and complete disarmament as well, could be solved by one waft of a magic wand. In order to do so one would merely need to find some "procedural" basis in order to set up various and, of course, numerous working groups which would be instructed to discuss the "substance" of the problems. We understand that this is precisely the approach the Western delegations are inclined to take; but we also know that this is the surest method of leading the negotiations into an impasse and at the same time justifying the impasse by "difficulties of a technical nature". The history of the disarmament negotiations in the League of Nations eloquently testifies to the highly dubious merits of such a method.

At the meeting on 21 July the United States representative said:

"One of those discussions concerns procedure: the quest for an agreed basis on which to set up a working group on nuclear delivery vehicles ...

"The question of setting up a working group ... is procedural. It is to find a basis for a detailed examination of the technical and practical factors involved in the reduction of nuclear delivery vehicles under a disarmament agreement". (ibid.)

As our discussion shows, we lack precisely this agreed basis which would enable us to begin, with real prospects of success, a fruitful discussion of technical and practical problems relating to the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles.

To an inexperienced observer listening to statements of the Western delegations it may seem that in the Eighteen-Nation Committee great progress has been made in regard to eliminating the threat of nuclear war, and that there now remain only some technical details to be considered in a working group. Furthermore, the establishment of such a group is apparently being hindered only by the "stubbornness" of the delegations of the socialist countries, which are allegedly "imposing" a single and sole proposal --- their own. Incidentally, this is the way in which public opinion in the West is being informed --- or rather, misinformed.

The real reason, however, why we have not yet found an agreed basis for a working group is neither procedural nor technical. The fact is that the Western Powers are stubbornly adhering to a single, sole, unchanged position on the question of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, a position which was reflected in their plan of 18 April 1962 (ENDC/30). The only reason preventing any progress in our

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negotiations lies in the fact that the Western Powers have from the very beginning of the discussions in the Eighteen-Nation Committee kept to one and the same unchanged "philosophy" of disarmament -- a "philosophy" based on the thesis of the miraculous power of weapons of mass destruction as a factor in the maintenance of peace throughout the world and as a guarantee of the security of the peoples.

It is therefore a question of a certain line in the policy of the Western Powers which has two negative aspects from the point of view of the work of our Committee. Notwithstanding the terrible lessons of the whole history of mankind, notwithstanding two world wars, there is once again being propagated in the West the maxim of the ancient Roman conquerors that if you wish for peace you must prepare for war; once again an attempt is being made to convince the peoples that armaments are not a means of waging war but a means of guarding peace. At the same time, and particularly as regards nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles, the Western Powers consider that they must have superiority. They believe or pretend to believe in their superiority, and refuse to accept as a basis for negotiations equality of the two sides -- that is, equal security for both of them.

Let us look at the facts. The United States representative said that "since 1962 the Soviet Union has been asking the West to accept the so-called Gromyko plan in principle" (ENDC/PV.200, p.15). But Mr. Timberlake omitted to mention that, following the 1962 proposal, another proposal was made by Mr. Gromyko in the autumn of 1963 (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1). He omitted to mention that both the first and the second proposal of the Soviet Government regarding the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles were made with the aim of bringing closer together the positions of the sides and reducing "the considerable difference in approach between the Soviet and the Western proposals" (ENDC/PV.200, p.15) about which the United States representative spoke.

Mr. Timberlake said that the United States "welcomed the Soviet suggestion of a working group" (ibid.) but he omitted to mention that at the eighteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly and here in the Committee, as well as in many other forums, many governments and individual political and social leaders have welcomed the other Soviet proposal: namely, the proposal based on the concept of a "nuclear umbrella" as an important compromise step which opens up new prospects

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for our negotiations. In short, the United States representative omitted to mention that it was precisely these proposals that enabled us to reach our present discussion -- that is, the possibility of instructing a working group to prepare the workmanlike, practical stage of the negotiations on one of the basic problems of general and complete disarmament.

If one takes into consideration this "non-procedural" point of view, it is difficult to explain the assertions made by some Western delegations regarding the flexible approach of the West; their argument that one side is striving to impose its position or plan as a basis for the activities of the working group is completely unconvincing. It is not a question of accepting the point of view of "one side", still less of accepting the plan or any part of the plan of one side. This is more than clear to all, and there can be no doubt that it is equally clear to the Western delegations. In that respect detailed and very clear explanations have been given by the Soviet delegation. It is a question of something quite different and at the same time perfectly clear: namely, to reach agreement on the terms of reference of the working group based on the acceptance of a definite position of principle on the basis of which it is possible to find concrete technical solutions to a whole number of questions arising in connexion with acceptance of this principle.

It is therefore not a question of any preliminary conditions in the sense of accepting this or that specific plan of "one side". The only condition -- if it is possible at all to speak of a condition in this case -- which should be considered mandatory is that of precluding any possibility of fruitless discussion in the working group, of avoiding the possibility of another impasse, which we consider to be inevitable if the working group begins its activities in the absence of a uniform approach to the problem of eliminating nuclear weapon delivery vehicles.

The thorough analysis made by the Soviet representative of the ideas and formulae put forward by the delegations of the non-aligned countries shows that that is basically the guiding principle of the representatives of those countries. This analysis shows that the non-aligned delegations in any case do not approach the question of the terms of reference of the working group from a "procedural" point of view, but are striving to find a mutually-acceptable basis for the

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activities of the working group, not starting out from the consideration of setting up a working group at any price, but from the consideration of ensuring such a basis for the activities of the working group as would create the most favourable conditions possible for the solution of the problem.

As has been indicated by Mr. Tsarapkin, in all the proposals of the representatives of the non-aligned States aimed at finding a compromise approach to the problem of eliminating nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, two basic criteria are found in one form or another: first, to ensure at the earliest stage of disarmament -- that is, in the first stage -- the elimination of the threat of a thermonuclear war; and second, to secure for this purpose that the nuclear weapon delivery vehicles to be retained should be strictly limited and minimum, so to guarantee a situation where the "nuclear umbrella" (or "minimum deterrent", or "nuclear shield") itself could not serve as an instrument for unleashing a thermonuclear war (ENDC/PV.204, pp.6,7).

In taking that thoroughly logical approach, the representatives of the non-aligned countries, like most of the States Members of the United Nations, evidently base themselves on the correct fundamental position regarding the problem of general and complete disarmament. They see the main guarantee of the security of States, the main means of eliminating the threat of nuclear war, not in the maintenance of any particular quantity of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles until the end of the disarmament process, but in the destruction of all these vehicles and of all the nuclear weapons themselves as early as possible and as completely as possible.

For this reason the approach proposed by the socialist countries regarding the terms of reference of the working group cannot be interpreted as imposing any specific proposal or plan of one side. As has been explained several times by the socialist delegations, the principle of the idea of a "nuclear umbrella", or "minimum deterrent", or, as some prefer to call it, "nuclear shield", can and should be taken as the basis for the activities of the working group, as the basic starting-point for its work.

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The efforts of the Western delegations to create an erroneous idea of the position of the socialist countries regarding the terms of reference of the working group, their striving to create the impression that the obstacle to the achievement of agreement on this question lies in the demand that the proposal of the Soviet Union should be accepted a priori as a basis for the activities of the working group -- all these efforts are in fact aimed at concealing the lack of desire and willingness on the part of the Western Powers to accept a compromise -- I stress a compromise -- approach to the solution of the question of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles: namely the concept of a "nuclear umbrella".

Actually nobody in the Eighteen-Nation Committee has said that the working group should consider a single and sole proposal. What was said was that the principle put forward in the Gromyko proposal should be taken as the basis for the activities of the working group. But proposals that correspond to that principle could and should be considered -- any proposals that correspond to the principle of the retention of a minimum number of delivery vehicles in the earliest stage of disarmament.

As you see, it is not a question of a "technical" or "procedural" nature, but a question of policy, the points of view of States, political plans and intentions. It is there, and not somewhere else, that we have to seek a compromise. It is there, and not somewhere else, that flexibility and the desire to find a mutually-acceptable solution must be shown. Such a mutually-acceptable solution can only be one which takes equally into account the interests of security of all the countries directly concerned, the interests of security of all the Powers and all the peoples.

It is obvious that the Western Powers really must reconsider their positions. It is essential that they should make efforts to modify certain "concepts" connected with the problems of general and complete disarmament, "concepts" which, as becomes increasingly clear from day to day, cannot in the conditions of the thermonuclear age serve as a starting-point for solving the problem of disarmament.

One cannot find a "technical" solution to problems such as, for instance, the question whether the security of the peoples and general peace depend on the nuclear might of the Powers and, consequently, on keeping the nuclear potential of States untouched until the end of the disarmament process, or whether the interests of

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peace and the genuine security of the peoples make it necessary to take radical measures which would eliminate the danger of nuclear war at the first stage of the disarmament process and thus ensure a solid basis for and give a decisive initial impulse to the implementation of the programme of general and complete disarmament.

Truth obliges me to state that this is not only the opinion of ourselves. I shall give just one quotation which proves that several people in the West have the same view:

"National security does not depend, and cannot depend, exclusively on military power. Since the Second World War, United States military power has increased tremendously, thanks to the invention of atomic weapons and ballistic missiles, but at the same time the national security of the United States of America has rapidly and constantly decreased. Until the moment when the foreign policy of the great Powers is based on reason -- let it not be virtue, but just reason -- the nuclear weapon is not so much a tool as a hindrance to the implementation of that policy". ^{1/}

It seems to me that those words, pronounced in the Senate of the United States by Senator Fulbright in the autumn of 1963, do not reflect a single, isolated opinion in the United States and in other Western countries. One must therefore hope that similar sober views will be reflected in the positions of the United States delegation in the disarmament negotiations and in the approach of the Western Powers to the problems of disarmament.

Beyond all doubt, the prospects for our negotiations will then be considerably better. There is also no doubt that the forum in which problems such as the serious problem of eliminating the danger of nuclear war can be solved in principle is not a working group, a committee or a sub-committee of experts. But when the basic problems have been solved, and when the will of all to make a thermonuclear war completely impossible has been unequivocally declared, then a working group will help us to find the best practical means of implementing that general desire.

1/ Translated from Russian.

Mr. TAHCURDIN (United Kingdom): First of all I should like to associate myself with the statements that have been made on the death last week of Mr. Zawadski, Chairman of the Polish Council of State, and to express the condolences of the United Kingdom delegation to our Polish colleagues.

Turning now to the subject under discussion today, the Committee may recall that on 4 August (ENDC/PV.204, p.22) I expressed some disappointment with the statements made at the same meeting by our Soviet and Czechoslovak colleagues. I did so because, on first hearing, their statements did not appear to represent any significant advance from their previous position, which has so far made it difficult to make progress towards the establishment of a working group on nuclear delivery vehicles. After studying those statements very carefully in the verbatim record, I regret to say that my first impressions have been confirmed. Both Mr. Tsarapkin and Mr. Kurka seem to have been insisting again -- as indeed did Mr. Lukhanov this morning -- that we must make a major addition to the present areas of agreement between the two sides before a working group can be set up.

As we see it, this is not really a tenable position, since, as Western delegations have often pointed out, these areas of agreement already seem quite sufficient to enable us to draft terms of reference for a working group. In fact, as our United States colleague said last Tuesday, "all the necessary ingredients for the creation of a working group seem to be present." (ibid., p.18). In particular -- and Mr. Timberlake also emphasized this point (ibid.) -- we do now seem to be generally agreed that both sides should retain nuclear deterrents throughout the disarmament process.

I think that our Swedish colleague put the matter in a nutshell when she said a fortnight ago that she simply failed "to detect any basic divergence of views" (ENDC/PV.202, p.5) and that "agreement on fundamentals can now be taken for granted" (ibid., p.6). As Mrs. Myrdal pointed out, all other issues must be considered as secondary, "as 'modalities', appropriate for settlement after technical scrutiny in a working group." (ibid.)

Unfortunately, our Soviet and East European colleagues are still apparently insisting that most of these secondary issues to which Mrs. Myrdal referred must be prejudged before a working group has undertaken a technical scrutiny. Our Soviet

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and East European colleagues still seem to think that the present areas of agreement are not enough for the purpose of setting up a working group. We are bound to ask ourselves why our Soviet colleagues have apparently reverted to the sort of position they adopted in past sessions, to ask why they have shown a renewed reluctance to join the rest of us in starting to build, as build we must sooner or later, on the foundations which have now been laid. For they do seem to have taken a backward step by now equating the so-called "nuclear umbrella" concept with their own particular version of it -- that is to say, Mr. Gromyko's proposal (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1). They do now seem to be suggesting that there can be no other version of that concept except their own.

In asking us to accept that concept as a precondition of a working group, they do now seem in effect -- despite the attempt of our Bulgarian colleague to argue to the contrary this morning -- to be asking us to accept Mr. Gromyko's proposal prior to its examination. Moreover, they are asking us to accept a proposal which they themselves have admitted has not so far been specifically formulated and which, to use Mr. Kurka's phrase last Tuesday, "is not a project worked out in detail" (ENDC/PV.204, p.16). They are asking us to accept, as has been said, "sight unseen" a proposal which we all want to see referred to a working group, a proposal which indeed must be referred to and examined by such a group before its validity or otherwise can be finally assessed. That attitude can only, I suggest, be a disappointment to the rest of us.

Our Soviet colleagues are trying to obtain agreement in principle that discussion in a working group of proposals other than their own -- or at least of proposals other than those very closely related to their own -- should be foreclosed in advance. That amounts to prejudging the results of the working group. As has already been remarked, it amounts to an attempt to impose Mr. Gromyko's proposal on the Committee by procedural methods.

I should like in this connexion to take up a remark made last week by our Czechoslovak colleague when he argued that the very idea of negotiations would be contradicted by what he called a demand "that in the matter of delivery vehicles the Soviet Union should agree to the concept of a percentage reduction." (ibid., p.17) He went on to say: "That would not be a compromise but would be acceptance of the Western position." (ibid.)

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But we have said repeatedly -- and I thought that this was now fully understood by all delegations -- that we in the West are not demanding, as a condition for setting up a working group, that the Soviet Union should accept the Western proposals for the reduction of nuclear delivery vehicles. All we have said is that our proposals should be discussed as well as those of the Soviet Union, and indeed any proposals which other delegations may wish to put forward also. We have said more than once that in our view agreement to discuss a proposal does not involve prior acceptance of it.

It is, as I have said, disappointing that, in contrast to our position, our Soviet colleagues are still apparently adopting an essentially one-sided approach to this matter. It is an approach which they surely cannot expect the rest of us to endorse or accept. Indeed it is already clear that most representatives here, including our non-aligned colleagues, do not share, and indeed have rejected, such an approach. Therefore I urge our Soviet colleagues to think again whether their reluctance to approach this important matter on a reciprocal basis is not in fact spoiling the possibility of making progress -- progress which we all want to achieve just as much as they do.

After all, what is the alternative if we fail to set up a working group on a mutually-acceptable basis? Will the prospects of making progress towards a solution of this vital matter of nuclear delivery vehicles -- this matter which lies at the very heart of the problem of disarmament -- be any brighter without such a group? I for one, doubt it. We have now spent nearly two and a half years -- on and off - discussing this problem in our plenary meetings. Unfortunately, so far neither side seems able at present to accept the other's proposals. That is disappointing, to say the least. But would it not now be sensible to accept this fact and to set up a working group, without prejudice to the proposals of either side, to see whether existing differences could not in fact be resolved? As Mrs. Myrdal said on 28 July, "it would seem premature to expect unanimity before a detailed study is made." (ENDC/PV.202, p.6)

It is with that plea that I should like to echo the hope expressed by Mr. Tsarapkin last Tuesday that "given good will, it should be possible even at this session of the Committee to achieve some positive results in this field."

(ENDC/PV.204, p.5)

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 206th meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador Carlo Lukonov, representative of Bulgaria.

"The Conference observed one minute of silence in tribute to the memory of the Chairman of the Council of State of Poland, Mr. Aleksander Zawadski. The representative of Poland extended his thanks to the Conference.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Bulgaria and the United Kingdom.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 13 August 1964, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 11.30 a.m.